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EVALUATION TOOL FOR DELIVERABLE 8:  
The MMRS Plan For  
Hospitals and Healthcare Systems

Develop a component of the MMRS Plan for the local hospital and healthcare system that will assure a surge capacity to accommodate 500 critically ill patients in hospitals and/or alternative care facilities.

A. This component shall address the following ten general areas:
   (1) Plans for notification of hospitals, clinics, HMOs, etc. that an incident has occurred
   (2) Plans and procedures in place for hospitals, clinics, and HMOs to protect them from contamination from environmental or patient sources
   (3) Plans for providing triage and initiation of definitive care at local healthcare facilities
   (4) Plans for adequate security to support these activities
   (5) Availability of adequate hospital and clinic provider personnel with personal protective equipment and pharmaceuticals
   (6) Adequate, locally available pharmaceuticals and equipment (e.g., ventilators) or that plans are in place to obtain them in a timely manner
   (7) Ability of medical staff to recognize and treat casualties caused by a WMD agent
   (8) Treatment protocols are readily available
   (9) Procedures to recall staff
   (10) Procedures to deliver non-medical supplies.

B. Indicators of Fulfillment:

08.01 □ Does the Component MMRS plan detail procedures for notification of hospitals, clinics, HMOs, etc. that an incident has occurred?

08.02 □ Does the Component MMRS plan identify procedures in place to protect hospitals, clinics, and HMOs from contamination from environmental or patient sources (lock-down procedures)?

08.03 □ Does the Component MMRS plan detail that local healthcare facilities are capable of providing triage and initiation of definitive care?

08.04 □ Does the Component MMRS plan include the existence of adequate security to support these activities?

08.05 □ Does the Component MMRS plan identify the availability of adequate personal protective equipment for hospital and clinic providers?

08.06 □ Does the Component MMRS plan specify that adequate pharmaceuticals and equipment (ventilators) are available locally, or that plans are in place to obtain them in a timely manner?

08.07 □ Does the Component MMRS plan specify that medical staff can recognize and treat casualties caused by WMD agents?

08.08 □ Does the Component MMRS plan detail that treatment protocols are readily available?

08.09 □ Does the Plan detail procedures to recall staff?

08.10 □ Does the Plan detail procedures to deliver non-medical supplies to appropriate facilities
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A. INTRODUCTION

In the event of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) event, local hospitals and healthcare providers will play a significant role in the treatment of victims who may have been exposed to chemical, biological or radioactive agents. This plan is designed to:

- Provide an overview of the general readiness of the area healthcare systems in the Capitol Region of Connecticut to respond to a WMD event
- Identify weak points in our capability to survive a WMD incident
- Present strategies to resolve the identified gaps in our preparedness

Participating hospitals in the Capitol Region MMRS jurisdiction include:

Bristol Hospital    Johnson Memorial Hospital
Connecticut Children’s Medical Center    Manchester Hospital
Day Kimball Hospital    New Britain General Hospital
Hartford Hospital**    Rockville General Hospital
John Dempsey Hospital    St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center

* The Capitol Region MMRS includes other healthcare facilities including nursing homes, well-care centers, and other specialized caregivers
** Hartford Hospital is one of two CT hospitals designated a Center of Excellence by the CT Commissioner of Public Health

B. OBJECTIVES

The Capitol Region MMRS Deliverable 8 has the following objectives:

1. Identify existing systems within healthcare facilities to initiate and to manage the medical treatment of potential victims of a WMD incident, including notification, triage and decontamination
2. Identify any deficiencies within existing systems, and recommend potential actions to correct outstanding systems gaps
3. Delineate provisions for appropriate medical care, treatment and follow-up to victims potentially exposed to chemical, biological or radioactive agents
4. Ensure adequate personal protective equipment (PPE) is in place to protect hospital staff from exposure to chemical, biological or radioactive agents
5. Determine that adequate plans are in place to prevent unnecessary loss of service resulting from chemical/biological/radioactive contamination of hospitals and equipment
6. Establish competency and proficiency of staff to recognize and treat WMD-related casualties through appropriate training, reliable equipment, and ongoing education
C. NOTIFICATION PROCESS OF A WMD EVENT TO HOSPITALS AND OTHER HEALTHCARE INSTITUTIONS (08.01)

The Capitol Region MMRS Plan coordinates with the overall Disaster Communications Plan described in the following information obtained from the CT Department of Public Health (CTDPH):

CT ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION PROCESS (DRAFT)

1. Assumptions:

- Initiation of the emergency communications process begins with notification of the event from a local (i.e. hospital, nursing home, health department), state, or federal entity regarding a pending or actual disaster event
  - Communication of emergency information from a local institution begins with notification to the local 911 Dispatch Center. 911 Dispatch shall notify appropriate local authorities and begin the process of coordinating the local response
  - If it is anticipated that local resources will be overwhelmed, 911 Dispatch or other local command authority may activate existing mutual aid agreements, or may choose to activate the CREPC Regional Emergency Deployment (RED) Plan by calling 860-832-3477
  - Activation of the RED Plan brings to bear the regional mechanism for coordinating and deploying regional resources in support of the local incident command
- Specifically for inter-communications among hospitals, the acute care hospital emergency communications process may be established to coordinate communications between the Centers of Excellence, the other acute care hospitals, and CTDPH for assistance in acquiring state, federal and military assets
- This emergency communications process is the vehicle for the initial and ongoing communication process utilized by the Department of CT Public Health (CTDPH), the Yale New Haven Health System (YNHHS) Center of Excellence (CoE), the Hartford Hospital (HH) Center of Excellence (CoE), the CT acute care hospitals (ACH), and the Connecticut Hospital Association (CHA) during an emergency. This plan represents only the hospital segment of the overall public health emergency communications process for Connecticut.
- Since this emergency communications process is primarily focused on acute care hospitals, CTDPH will establish communication with local public health, emergency medical services, intra-agency departments (OPHP, OEMS, etc.), intra-state agencies (DEMHS, CSP, etc.), inter-state health departments (NYDPH, MADPH, etc.) and the federal government (HHS, CDC, etc.).
- The use of this emergency communication process assumes that, at any time during an emergency, CTDPH can initiate direct contact with any of the 32 acute care hospitals throughout the state.
- This emergency communication process also assumes that, if there are significant changes to the magnitude of the emergency event, or additional threats or unexpected resource requirements, communication between CTDPH, YNHHS CoE, HH CoE, hospitals and the CHA shall be immediate and not wait for any predetermined time for a status update.
2. Hospital Communications Activation Process:

Note: the following steps are to be followed after the hospital has notified local 911 Dispatch of the nature and magnitude of the incident.

STEP I - Initial Contact By CTDPH:

- CTDPH initiates individual contact with YNHHS CoE
- CTDPH initiates individual contact with HH CoE
- CTDPH initiates individual contact with CHA

STEP II – Initial 4-Way Conference Call:

CTDPH  
YNHHS CoE  
CHA  
HH CoE

STEP III - Hospital Information / Intelligence Gathering:

- YNHHS CoE contacts southern tier hospitals
- HH CoE contacts northern tier hospitals
- CHA contacts all hospitals via listserv

STEP IV – Information/Intelligence Reporting:

- YNHHS and HH CoE’s and CHA report to CTDPH with information on event impact and current resources available at the hospitals

STEP V - Additional 4-Way Conference Calls:

- Periodic (every 60-120 minutes) 4-way conference calls among CTDPH, YNHHS, HH, and CHA to discuss information required based upon known or perceived disaster needs, including:
  - Bed availability (E.D., critical care, med/surg/ pediatrics, burn)
  - Personnel availability (clinical/non-clinical)
  - Supply and equipment availability (med-surg/pharmaceutical
  - Facility/Infrastructure conditions (water, HVAC, fuel, electric, etc.)
  - Telecommunications status (phone, pager, IT, etc.)
  - Security/ Decontamination status
  - Support Services (transportation, food, sleeping quarters, etc.)

In the Capitol Region, communications among local hospitals and pre-hospital responders is coordinated during a localized event through the CMED system. Should the hospitals anticipate being overwhelmed and there is urgent need for regional resources, the hospitals may contact the Regional Incident Communications System (RICS) established by the Capitol Region Emergency Response Committee (CREPC). The RICS system is activated by a single phone call to 860-832-3477. A hospital may request the activation of the CREPC Regional Emergency Disaster Plan (CREPC RED Plan) and specify the resources required to meet the needs of the hospital.

CREPC, particularly Emergency Support Function 5: Emergency Management (ESF 5), serves as the coordinating resource for gathering regional assets and leadership to support local incident management. CREPC ESF 2 (Communications) shall assure adequate communications capacity between hospitals and first responders once the
RED Plan has been activated. Through the Capitol Region MMRS, a function of CREPC ESF 8 (Public Health and Medical Services), discussions among hospital representatives and pre-hospital officials are being conducted to solidify the communications process prior to an event, including the development of redundant systems (telephone, direct connect, radio, amateur radio (HAM), electronic data).

The 41 communities participating in the Capitol Region Emergency Planning Committee process have agreed to respond to any emergency event according to the systems defined in the CREPC RED Plan. The RED Plan specifies that all participating response agencies shall utilize the Incident Command System as promulgated by the National Incident Management System (NIMS). This requirement applies to the CREPC region’s hospitals as well, and all of the hospitals in the region utilize the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS).

A. HOSPITAL AND OTHER HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS: SECURITY AND LOCK DOWN CAPABILITIES (08.02, 08.04)

Each hospital in the Capitol Region MMRS jurisdictional area has developed a hospital security plan for use in the event of a disaster. Usually, the hospital Emergency Department is designated as the entry control point for victims of a possible WMD incident. Hospitals plan also for the need to lock down (i.e., no one in, no one out) the facility if potentially contaminated patients cannot be managed safely without threatening the integrity of the institution.

Most hospital plans specify the use of a combination of locking devices and pre-assigned institutional security staff to enforce lock-down procedures. Using security staff to lock down a facility minimizes the availability of those officers to handle the general unrest of patients and visitors that is a major consideration in planning for any mass casualty incident. Hospitals may access additional regional law enforcement resources to support their lock-downs by activating the CREPC RED Plan via a telephone call to RICS at 860-832-3477 to request additional assets. CREPC ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) is charged with the responsibility to acquire and manage the deployment of regional, state and federal law enforcement personnel in response to a request for local assistance.

To date, planning sessions involving hospital management and law enforcement personnel to address the issues of perimeter and interior security, crowd management and lock-down procedures largely have been ineffective. Hospitals security plans have created a great demand for rapid deployment of additional security personnel, while local police agencies have been severely handicapped due to budgetary constraints and staffing cuts. The result has been an inadequate pool of officers to provide both civil and institutional support. Efforts by the region’s hospitals to coordinate their security plans so as to maximize the efficient use of their security resources are under way.

Discussions on a planning level to ensure incorporation of alternate care facilities into security and preparedness systems to date are limited to individual hospitals speaking with their traditional supporting agencies (nursing homes, extended care facilities, etc.). The hospital Centers of Excellence have surveyed these agencies to determine their level of preparedness, but data from that survey has not been correlated or published.
E. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR PERSONNEL (08.05)

Hospitals recognize and appreciate the need to provide personal protective equipment (PPE) to both clinical and non-clinical staff assigned to assist the facility in management of potential exposures to chemical, biological or radioactive agents. The CT Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (DEMHS) has instituted a project utilizing federal grant funding to provide each of CT’s 32 acute care hospitals with a base level of PPE protection. However, due to funding limitations, PPE has not been made available to alternate care facilities as yet.

In the Capitol Region, the hospitals presently have baseline PPE capacities as follows:

Level C PPE  360
PAPR’s      127

F. AVAILABILITY OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND VENTILATORS (08.06)

Pharmaceutical Stockpiles:

1. In the Capitol Region, the Capitol Region MMRS pharmaceutical stockpile has been created to provide protection primarily to the region’s first responders and their families. The MMRS stockpile can provide agents to prevent the effects of a chemical exposure to 1,500 first responders, and biological agent protection for up to 15,000 first responders and their families.

2. The CT Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security provided one-time funding in the amount of $10,000 to each of CT’s 32 acute care hospitals to encourage the development of a pharmaceutical stockpile for the protection of their staffs and affiliated first responders.

3. A statewide taskforce consisting of regional, state and federal agencies, including CR-MMRS, has developed a plan for a state stockpile of nerve agent antidotes that would be sufficient to provide force protection for the state’s estimated 65,000 first responders. Training plans were approved and funded in 2005. State distribution of the nerve agent antidote kits has not begun.

4. At this time, the CR-MMRS Mark I kit stockpile remains the sole resource available in CT other than the stockpile at the West Haven Veterans Administration Hospital. Activation of the federal CHEMPAK project in CT, anticipated in the Fall of 2006, may alleviate this deficiency if the mechanism for deployment is quick and responsive to local needs.
5. An estimate of the number of ventilators available at Capitol Region hospitals follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital</th>
<th>Maximum Number of Ventilators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bristol Hospital</td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson Memorial Hospital</td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut Children’s Medical Center</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Hospital</td>
<td>11-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Kimball Hospital</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Britain General Hospital</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartford Hospital</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockville General Hospital</td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Dempsey Hospital</td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maximum On an Average Day 140

The Capitol Region MMRS also maintains a cache of 200 adult and 60 pediatric Vortran portable resuscitators designed primarily to support EMS on-scene operations, but available to the hospitals upon request.

G. HOSPITAL CAPABILITY TO RECOGNIZE AND TREAT VICTIMS OF A WMD INCIDENT (08.07)

The key to the successful management of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incident is contingent upon the early detection of public exposure to a WMD agent. Based on available research, hospitals likely will be among the first agencies to detect a suspected biological outbreak, as the facilities identify otherwise healthy patients who become seriously ill or die. But because contamination may not be detectable for as long as 72 hours, by the time a hospital is aware that a biological agent is suspected, both hospital facilities and their staffs may have been exposed to the contaminant.

A second major factor in successful incident management is the adequate education and training of EMS personnel, emergency department physicians, and other healthcare workers to identify symptoms of exposure. Current training for both hospital and pre-hospital responders in Connecticut is coordinated through the CTTrainFinder Assistance Integrated Network (CT TRAIN), a function of CTDPH in coordination with the CT Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security and the University of Connecticut. CT TRAIN provides hundreds of training opportunities using classroom and distance learning methods, satellite transmissions, and web-based courses to ensure that CT’s responders have ample opportunity to improve their bioterrorism knowledge base.

Additionally, educational requirements for hospital internship and residency programs include courses to raise the awareness of physicians-in-training to recognize, manage and treat illnesses resulting from a WMD event.

The Capitol Region MMRS (CR-MMRS) has instituted a comprehensive one-day train-the-trainer curriculum designed to provide CREPC regional training officers with basic awareness level training on chemical agent exposures and the use of the Nerve Agent
Antidote Kits (Mark I kit plus diazepam auto-injector) that are provided to area first responding agencies by CR-MMRS. The training has received approval from the CT Department of Consumer Protection and the Drug Enforcement Agency. To date, approximately 700 training officers have been certified and almost 1900 first responders are protected in the field by the kits.

Additional CREPC regional training on a variety of topics is offered to ensure uniformity of training on issues common to both hospital and pre-hospital responders. Detailed information can be found in CR-MMRS Deliverable 9: the CR-MMRS Training Program.

A third element in the successful management of an incident is the presence of communications networks, developed and tested prior to an event, that allow the rapid and timely sharing of information among hospital and pre-hospital response teams. In the Capitol Region, CREPC Emergency Services Function 2 (ESF 2: Communications) has participated in discussions with hospital communication staff to assure the ability of the region’s hospitals to communicate effectively with local health departments and other regional response agencies, including incident command.

Procedures for implementing syndromic surveillance procedures at the local, regional and state levels are detailed in the CR-MMRS Deliverable 4: Response to a Biological Agent. A sampling of additional communications systems available for use by the region’s hospitals includes:

1. CTDPH has purchased and deployed a satellite telephone system to each acute care hospital so that reliable communications from the hospitals to CTDPH can be established in the direst of circumstances.
2. The CT Health Alert Network (CTHAN), operated by CT Department of Public Health, is operational and relies on redundant means including telephone, wireless and electronic mail to contact key health professionals in the event of an emergency.
3. The CT Amateur Radio Relay League has established a system for deployment of a HAM radio operator and essential equipment to each hospital in the event of a disaster.

Recent drills and exercises conducted by CREPC and CR-MMRS in the Capitol Region of Connecticut have focused almost exclusively on the public health aspects of emergency management, so that each of these communications systems has been tested and evaluated relative to regional hospital participation. Under the auspices of CREPC ESF 2, the upgrading of the hospital communications capacities is ongoing and constant based on lessons learned from the frequent drills.

H. AVAILABILITY OF TREATMENT PROTOCOLS (08.08)

1. Decontamination:
   - The Capitol Region MMRS has developed and published its *Rapid Action Mass Decontamination Protocol* (revised 2005). The RAMD plan specifies a three-phase system for the protection of the hospitals in the event of a mass decontamination incident that includes:
     1. Intra-facility minimum standards for decontamination capacity.
2. Activation procedures for regional assets to support hospital decontamination efforts

3. Activation of state and federal resources to support mass decontamination

2. Radiation Incident:
   - The CT Radiation Safety Response Group, a volunteer collaboration consisting of radiation safety officers, radiologists and radiation therapists, and other nuclear energy experts, have created a *Hospital Radiation Response Guide* to provide detailed, state-of-the-art information to hospital personnel on management techniques in the event of a radiation contamination incident. That document has been approved by the CT Environmental Protection Agency and CTDPH for distribution to all of CT’s hospitals.
   - Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control has released a comprehensive document entitled the *Interim Guidelines for Hospital Response to Mass Casualties from a Radiological Incident* that is available online to assist hospitals in their preparation to receive radiological casualties.

3. Chemical and Biological Incidents:
   - A wide variety of treatment protocols for the management of chemical and biological exposures are available at this time. They include:

G. HOSPITAL PLANS TO RECALL STAFF (08.09)

Under the terms of a grant received from CTDPH, the Yale-New Haven Health System has developed a hospital-based statewide credentialing plan that is designed to provide an efficient mechanism for the recall and augmentation of key hospital staff in the event of a disaster. All of Connecticut’s 32 acute care hospitals have signed onto the plan that incorporates the following provisions:

- Definition of a “public health emergency”
- Terms for implementation of the recall of hospital staff
- Description of a statewide database for credentials management
• Procedures for approval of volunteer credentials
• Rights and responsibilities of hospitals
• Rights and responsibilities of volunteers
• Malpractice and other liability concerns

H. DELIVERY OF NON-MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO FACILITIES (08.10)

The Capitol Region Emergency Planning Committee (CREPC), through its Emergency Services Function 5 (ESF 5), is charged with the responsibility of acquiring and deploying materiel and supplies following an activation of the CREPC Regional Emergency Disaster (RED) Plan. Requests for supplies that are non-medical in nature can be initiated by a single telephone call to RICS at 860-832-3477.

To date, no specific plan for the pre-event acquisition of non-medical supplies to be deployed in a medical emergency has been formulated. However, there have been efforts to develop certain elements of a plan, including:

• FY 2004 federal funding proposals from CTDPH contained a line item that provided nominal funding to local directors of health for the acquisition of supplies required to open prophylaxis/immunization facilities
• Hospital bioterrorism planning templates include a requirement for clearly defined supply lines in a disaster situation
• The CT Pharmaceutical Association has been working closely with CTDPH to establish lines of supply for pharmaceutical supplementation prior to arrival of elements of the Strategic National Stockpile, but non-medical supplies have not been included in those discussions

Criteria for future planning for acquisition of non-medical supplies include:

• Identification and acquisition of non-medical supplies in sufficient quantity to meet the region’s needs for 24-96 hours, or until arrival of federally deployed assets
• Storage, security and transportation
• Pre-event stockpiling

I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• Decontamination: Connecticut has the capacity to manage the mass decontamination of its citizenry without jeopardizing the safety of the state’s 32 acute care hospitals. CTDEMHS has provided baseline decontamination equipment to each of the hospitals so that each facility can manage a small decontamination event on its own. The Capitol Region MMRS Rapid Action Mass Decontamination Protocol describes a regional three-phase approach to the management of large numbers of contaminated victims that specifies the use of the regional fire services and eventually the state decontamination trailers in protecting the hospitals.
- **Recommendation**: train hospital and pre-hospital decontamination personnel together in the use of the equipment prior to an occurrence.

- **Training**: The current level of training available to hospital and pre-hospital personnel on issues of bioterrorism and chemical agent exposure is very high, and additional opportunities for training and awareness are being added constantly, usually at no cost to the individual.
- **Recommendations**: 1) Develop uniform standards for training to ensure that responders from all around the state are familiar with the most common systems and equipment used at the hospitals. 2) Develop standards for recurrent training to ensure timely reinforcement of key principles. 3) Training also must be made available and must be encouraged among those who staff alternate care facilities and emergency response agencies.

- **Personal Protective Equipment**: All CT hospitals have acquired baseline levels of appropriate PPE to ensure staff safety from chemical, biological and radioactive agents. Training on the appropriate use of this equipment is time-consuming. But alternate care facilities have not been included in this process despite the likely dependence by hospitals on these facilities to assist in managing patients in the event of a surge in the number of seriously ill patients.
  - **Recommendation**: Distribute PPE to alternate care facilities and train their staff with hospital staff.

- **Treatment Protocols** are readily available to hospital personnel. Uniform requirements for baseline knowledge have not been implemented.
  - **Recommendation**: Standards must be set for refresher courses so as to maintain currency in state-of-the-art information and practices.

- An effective **syndromic surveillance** system, accompanied by a strong working partnership between the hospitals and the state laboratory system, is critical to the successful management of a chemical or biological agent. Determined efforts by statewide working groups sponsored by CTDPH have been supplemented by recent federal grant funding so that a practical surveillance/diagnostic system can become a reality.
  - **Recommendation**: What remains is to develop solid lines of communication that reach beyond the hospitals and state agencies into the local and regional incident command structure so that critical incident management decisions accurately reflect current public health and hospital conditions in a timely manner.